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THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN
NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.*
The importance of corporations in the modern world of business can
hardly be exaggerated. These great artificial entities, reaching out and
entering into the intricacies of our daily existence, constitute a medium
for the transaction of a major share of the Nation's business. Hence it
becomes a matter of utmost importance to ascertain the scope of powers
given to ordinary business corporations, and to consider the effect of
their exceeding this authority.
I. THE CoMMoN LAW
In England in the seventeenth century, Sutton's Hospital Case'
recognized the capacity of a corporation to do any act which could be
done by an individual. Later, with respect to corporations created by
parliamentary charter or under a general corporation act, this theory
of corporate capacity was superseded in England by the adoption of a
theory of limited capacity or special powers.2 According to this theory,
a contract which is ultra vires, that is, beyond the powers outlined in
the purpose clause of the charter or articles of incorporation, is void and
cannot be used as the basis for an action. This extreme view was intro-
duced into American Law, and is still recognized by the United States
Supreme Court3 and the courts of Alabama,4 Maine,5 Massachusetts,6
Tennessee,7 and perhaps Maryland,8 although usually in a somewhat
modified form.
The United States Supreme Court, while adhering to the basic
proposition that such a contract was void,9 soon found that in order to
* Member of the North Carolina State Bar; A.B., J.D., University of North
Carolina. Assisted in this article by the LAw REVIEW Editorial Staff.110 Coke's Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (1613).
2 Ashbury Ry. Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653 (1875); Carpenter, Should the
Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded (1923) 33 YALE L. 3. 49, 50.
'Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 S. Ct. 478,
35 L. ed. 55 (1891).
' See Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala. 115, 3 So. 307 (1887).
See Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas Co., 85 Me. 532, 27 At. 525
(1893).
' See Nashua & L. R. R. v. Boston & L. R. R., 164 Mass. 222, 41 N. E. 268
(1895); Davis v. Old Colony R. R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881); Note (1936) 16
B. U. L. REV. 194.
Buckeye Marble & Freestone Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 20 S. W. 427
(1892).
' In .Maryland there are expressions in the opinions of the Court of Appeals
that seem to adopt this view, but the decisions are so conflicting in theory that this
is not at all certain. Note (1936) 1 MD. L. RFv. 145.
' Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 S. Ct.
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reach just results it was forced to hand down decisions which were
irreconcilable with that doctrine.' 0 Out of the confusion, however, have
come at least two cardinal principles. (1) Although a wholly executory
ultra vires contract is not enforceable,'- the Court will not disturb the
status acquired under such a contract when the agreement is fully
executed on both sides.12 This holding has been criticized as being
clearly inconsistent with the original theory, in that, the contract being
void, neither party could possibly acquire any rights under it' 3-the
whole transaction should be set aside, rather than to allow it to remain
performed. (2) However, the fact that a part of the contract was
executed would not affect the law as to the executory portion. 14 In this
situation the party who has performed on the faith of the existence of
the contract will be permitted to recover the value of his performance
in an appropriate action sounding in quasi contract.'5
Most state courts, even in the absence of remedial legislation, treat
the ultra vires transaction more liberally. They follow the Federal view
if the contract is either wholly executory or wholly executed; but depart
from it by holding that if the contract is executed on one side only, the
party who has performed is permitted to base an action on the contract
itself. Under this doctrine, based either upon a theory of an unfair
478, 35 L. ed. 55 (1891), cited supra note 3; California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 167
U. S. 362, 17 S. Ct. 831, 42 L. ed. 198 (1897).
10 See Colson, Tie Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court
Decisions (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 179-217, 297-337.
" See Thomas v. West Jersey R. R., 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. ed. 950 (1879).
12 St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. R. v. Terre Haute & I. R. R., 145 U. S. 393, 12
S. Ct. 953, 36 L. ed. 748 (1892). Thl case was followed in Harriman v. Northern
Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244, 25 S. e.. 493, 49 L. ed. 739 (1905), a case involving
an illegal contract, thereby showing that the Court will treat the contract in the
same manner, whether it be illegal in the true sense of the term or merely ultra
vires. In both instances the maxim in pan delicto polior est conditio defendcntlis
was applied. Cf. Herring v. Cumberland Lumber Co., 159 N. C. 382, 74 S. E. 1011
(1912), 163 N. C. 481, 79 S. E. 876 (1913).
13 Carpenter, supra note 2.
"Thomas v. West Jersey R. R., 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. ed. 950 (1879), cited supra
note 11.
10 Central Nat. Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196, 30 S. Ct. 364, 54 L. ed. 443
(1910) ; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car, Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 S. Ct.
478, 35 L. ed. 55 (1891). The lower federal courts were governed by the views
thus adopted by the Supreme Court. Farmers' & Miners' Bank et al. v. Bluefield
Nat. Bank et al., 11 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Richmond Guano Co. v.
Farmers' Cotton Seed Oil Mill et al., 126 Fed. 712 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903) ; Safety
Insulated Wire and Cable Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 74 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 4th,
1896). But see French v. Long et al., 42 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930). (Under
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1937) this
dbctrine would not apply when the jurisdiction of the federal court was based
solely on diversity of citizenship.) There is one North Carolina case which seems
to recognize the applicability of the federal rule to all cases where a corporation
with a federal charter exceed- its charter powers and makes an ultra vires agree-
ment. Com'rs. of Brunswick County v. Bank of Southport et al, 196 N. C. 198,
145 S. E. 227 (1928). But see Hutchins v. Planters' Nat. Bank, 128 N. C. 72, 38
S. E. 252 (1901): Elkhart County Nat. Farm Loan Ass'n v. Heilman, 101 Ind.
App. 183, 196 N. E. 350 (1935), criticized in note (1936) 49 HAv. L. REv. 653.
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acceptance of benefits or upon an abortive theory of estoppel, 16 the
opposing party is not permitted to set up the plea of ultra vires. Some
states, however, including North Carolina, allow an action based either
upon the contract or on quasi-contractual principles.
Only one state has announced a broader rule without a resort to
remedial legislation. The Kansas Court has declared that even an
executory ultra vires contract is enforceable.17 "The state grants the
corporation the right to do business under limitations expressed in lan-
guage to which both agree. Whether the language of the charter shall
be interpreted to authorize a given act is a matter between the parties
to it. If the state is satisfied with the construction upon which the cor-
poration acts, no reason is apparent why it should be open to question
by a stranger, much less by one who has recognized it as valid by con-
tracting with the corporation upon that basis.' 8 This court believes
that to allow the defense of ultra vires to be used by the corporation
or by a private person "as a means of obtaining or retaining something
of value which belongs to another, would be to turn an instrument
intended to affect justice between the state and corporations into one of
fraud as between the latter and innocent parties .... The doctrine that
only the state can challenge the validity of acts done under color of a
corporate charter, if accepted, must necessarily protect an executory
contract from collateral attack, equally with one that has been
executed."' 9
In North Carolina, rules governing the scope of corporate powers
have developed alongside the rise of corporations to their present im-
portance. The state court has declared that a corporation may exercise
only those powers, expressed or implied, which are granted to it by the
general corporation law and by its charter or articles of incorporation. 20
Powers conferred by charter are always strictly construed, 2 1 and per-
" There is no real basis for such an estoppel theory. Frey, Ultra Vires and
Estoppel (1909) 43 Am. L. REv. 81.
" Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (1907). It has
been pointed out that this much discussed case was one involving an executed lease
and that therefore what was said concerning executory transactions was merely
dictum. Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 454. An answer to this is that the
opinion leaves no possible doubt as to the attitude of the Kansas court toward
executory ultra vires contracts. What if the statement was merely a dictum? A
dictum of this sort may be of great force where it is the declaration of the attitude
of the court toward a certain type of contract, which is the case here.
x' Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 760, 92 Pac. 1123, 1126 (1907).
lo Id. at 758, 92 Pac. at 1126.
21 Watson v. King & Pace Lumber Co., 200 N. C. 8, 156 S. E. 93 (1930) ; Bar-
cello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C. 712, 24 S. E. 124 (1896).
"1 Elizabeth City Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, 188 N. C. 278, 124 S. E. 611
(1924); City of Durham v. Durham Public Service Co., 182 N. C. 333, 109 S. E.
40 (1921) ; Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. Allsbrook, 110 N. C. 137, 14 S. E. 652
(1892); Simomton v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 499 (1874); Raleigh & Gaston R. R. v.
Reid, 64 N. C. 155 (1870); State v. Petway, 55 N. C. 396 (1856); State v.
Mathews, 48 N. C. 451 (1856).
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sons dealing with corporations are chargeable with constructive notice
of the limitations and restrictions contained therein, 22 as well as with
notice of statutory limitations and restrictions. 23 As a whole, the North
Carolina law is somewhat clearer than is that of the Federal Courts, the
state court explaining its position quite lucidly in most instances, and
making only an occasional mistake in terminology.
2 4
To summarize the North Carolina law: There is an intimation in one
opinion that an udtra vires contract which is wholly executory on both
sides cannot be enforced by either party.25 When the contract has been
performed on one side, however, the court has held that it is enforceable
against the corporation, 26 and the natural supposition is that it would
likewise be enforceable against the party to whom the corporation has
become obligated.2 7 There are decisions which base this right of re-
covery upon the doctrine of estoppel.
28
-2 Peoples' Nat. Bank v. Southern States Finance Co., 192 N. C. 69, 133 S. E.
415 (1926). In Sherrill v. Am. Trust Co., 176 N. C. 591, 97 S. E. 471 (1918), it
is said, however, that a corporation would not be permitted to set up a plea of
ultra vires against a holder, otherwise bona fide, of a negotiable instrument if the
transaction was not such as to give the holder notice that the corporation had
exceeded its powers in making the instrument. And in Luttrell v. Martin and The
Piedmont Lumber, R. & M. Co., 112 N. C. 594, 17 S. E. 573 (1893), the court
made a point of the fact that the person who dealt with the corporation neither
knew nor could be expected to know that the contract was one which the company
was not authorized to make.
23 Thompson v. Shephard, et aL., 203 N. C. 310, 165 S. E. 796 (1932) ; Ellington
v. Raleigh Building Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E. 307 (1929).
" The term "ultra vires" has been used somewhat indiscriminately in the North
Carolina decisions. It has been employed to describe transactions which were
decided on the ground that a corporate agent had no authority to transact the
business in question. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Dunn Oil Mill Co., 157 N. C. 302,
73 S. E. 93 (1911) ; Pinchback v. Bessemer Mining Co., 117 N. C. 484, 23 S. E.
425 (1895). The term was used in one case to describe a transaction which was
violative of the by-laws, Phillips v. Interstate Land Co., 176 N. C. 514, 97 S. E.
417 (1918), and in another to indicate a contract which was void because of a
former statute of frauds applicable to corporate contracts. Clowe v. Imperial Pine
Product Co., 114 N. C. 304, 19 S. E. 153 (1894).
" Trustees of Charlotte Township v. Piedmont Realty Co., 134 N. C. 41, 46
S. E. 723 (1903).
2 Farmers' Atl. Bank v. Murfreesboro Nat. Bank, 198 N. C. 477, 152 S. E. 403
(1930) ; Sherrill v. Am. Trust Co., 176 N. C. 591, 97 S. E. 471 (1918) ; Luttrell v.
Martin and The Piedmont Lumber, R. & M. Co., 112 N. C. 594, 17 S. E. 573
(1893).
2See Trustees of Charlotte Township v. Piedmont Realty Co., 134 N. C. 41,
49, 46 S. E. 723, 726 (1903).
2 Bank of Canton v. Clark. 198 N. C. 169, 151 S. E. 102 (1929) ; Hutchins v.
Planters' Nat. Bank, 128 N. C. 72, 38 S. E. 252 (1901). See Trustees of Char-
lotte Township v. Piedmont Realty Co., 134 N. C. 41, 46 S. E. 723 (1903). The
estoppel rule applies only when a party has received benefits. In Brinson v. Mill
Supply Co., 219 N. C. 498, 14 S. E. (2d) 505 (1941), the corporation, not being
authorized to enter into a contract for the accommodation of another, made an
agreement of this nature by guaranteeing the payment of the personal note of its
president. Since the corporation received no benefits, however, it was held that its
receiver properly rejected a claim based on the contract for the reason that the
agreement was ultra ires. See also Brinson v. Mill Supply Co., 219 N. C. 505. 14
S. E. (2d) 509 (1941). The case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Rouse Banking Co..
191 N. C. 500, 132 S. E. 468 (1926), involved a special deposit with a bank for
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In this connection, it is helpful to consider a statute of frauds which
at one time existed in North Carolina, requiring all corporate contracts
of an amount exceeding one hundred dollars to be in writing.29 The
doctrines therein applied to parol corporate contracts over that value
were practically the same as those presently applied to ultra vires con-
tracts. Under that statute it was held that if the contract was entirely
executory, no action could be predicated thereupon by either party ;30
that if the contract was one which had been performed by one party, it
could be enforced against the other either by an action. on the contract3 1
or in an action based on quasi contractual principles ;32 but that if the
contract was only partially performed by such a person, he could recover
upon the executed portions only and would not be permitted to enforce
that part which was executory.3 3
In respect to ultra vires conveyances, the law is definitely settled that
the State is the only party that can object to a corporation exceeding its
actual authority in acquiring real property.3 4
On the other hand, North Carolina clearly recognizes the stock-
holder's right to prevent ultra vires -diversion of corporate funds. In a
much discussed decision, it was held that a textile corporation had nc
power to insure the life of one of its officers for the benefit of the com-
pany. The Court, declaring that such a diversion of the corporation's
funds could be prevented at the suit of a stockholder, enjoined payment
of all future premiums on the policy. 35 The decision was limited in
scope to that portion of the contract which was executory. It must, in
addition, be emphasized that in order to invoke this sort of remedy, the
the purpose of paying a debt contracted by the depositor, and the bank having
permitted him to withdraw the funds, the relationship was held to be one of trust.
In this instance it was held that the bank could not successfully make a plea of
ueltra vires in an action by the depositor's creditor for the breach of trust in
allowing the withdrawal.
2 N. C. CODE (1883) §683. This statute was repealed in 1893 (N. C. Pub. Laws
1893, c. 84), but not before numerous cases had been decided under its provisions.
'0 Curtis v. Piedmont Lumber & Mining Co., 109 N. C. 401, 13 S. E. 944
(1891).
31 Luttrell v. Martin and The Piedmont Lumber, R. & M. Co., 112 N. C. 594,
17 S. E. 573 (1893); Curtis v. Piedmont Lumber & Mining Co., 109 N. C. 401, 13
S. E. 944 (1891).
2 Clowe v. Imperial Pine Product Co., 114 N. C. 304, 19 S. E. 153 .(1894);
Roberts v. Deming Woodworking Co., 111 N. C. 432, 16 S. E. 415 (1892).
" Roberts v. Deming Woodworking Co., 111 N. C. 432, 16 S. E. 415 (1892).
"' Cross v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 172 N. C. 119, 90 S. E. 14 (1916); Beasley v.
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R., 145 N. C. 272, 59 S. E. 60 (1907) ; Barcello v. Hap-
good, 118 N. C. 712, 24 S. E. 124 (1896) ; Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N. C. 37 (1886).
But see Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers, 56 N. C. 253 (1857). The
federal view accords with the established North Carolina rule. National Bank v.
Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. ed. 188 (1878).
" Victor v. Louise Cotton Mills et al., 148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908). This
decision was evidently unpopular, for a statute was soon afterwards enacted which
gave corporations express power to insure the lives of their officers. N. C. COD-
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1126, ss.5.
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stockholder must act promptly and follow up his objection by "active
and preventive means"; for if he does not do this but rather waits until
the opposing party has changed his position, he will not then be per-
mitted to enjoin or defeat the contract by showing that it was ultra
vires.36
Another opinion intimates that an ultra vires contract made by cor-
porate agents in excess of their real or apparent authority is not capable
of being ratified by proper corporate action ;37 but this probably does
not mean that such a contract, if properly ratified, would not be gov-
erned by the same principles of law as the usual ultra vires transaction.
In the situation, however, where a corporate body undertakes to
perform an act which is foreign to the purposes expressed in its charter
or articles of incorporation, and in doing that unauthorized act injures
someone, the North Carolina Court follows the generally expressed rule
and forbids the corporation to set up ultra vires as a defense in the
consequent tort action for damages. 38
II. CRITICISM OF THE THEORETICAL BASES FOR THE
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
After this review of the existent law in North Carolina, the question
arises as to what, if anything, should be done in order to obtain the best
possible solution of the difficulties therein presented.
One of the most learned authorities on this subject, Professor Car-
penter, has enumerated and criticized the grounds advanced by various
courts for upholding the doctrine of ultra vires, analyzing them in the
following manner: 39 (1) The doctrine of limited capacity, (2) con-
structive notice of charter limitations, (3) illegality of contract, (4) pub-
lic policy, (5) violation of the rights of intra vires creditors, (6)
violation of the rights of innocent stockholders. A survey of the reason-
ing advanced with respect to each one of these propositions4o is desirable
at this point in order that we may obtain a more thorough understanding
of the problems involved:
(1) The objections raised with respect to the theory of limited
capacity or special powers are, (a) that it will not explain all of the
decisions in any one jurisdiction, (b) that it does not portray the true
36 Hill v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 143 N. C. 539, 55 S. E. 854 (1906).
" Respess v. Rex Spinning Co., 191 N. C. 809, 133 S. E. 391 (1926).
"s Britt v. Howell et al., 208 N. C. 519, 181 S. E. 619 (1935) ; Hussey v. Nor-
folk & S. R. R., 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. E. 923 (1887) ; Gruber v. Washington & J. R. R.,
92 N. C. 1 (1885). See also Warren, Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vircs Under-
takings (1925) 2 CAMB. L. J. 180.
'9 Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discardedf (1923) 33
YALE L. J. 49.
"0 Professor Carpenter also criticizes the theory of estoppel by receiving benefits
of an ultra vires contract. He believes that there is no true basis for estoppel, since
entering into the agreement affords as much ground for estoppel as accepting its
benefits.
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nature of the modern corporation, and (c) that unjust consequences
have often resulted from its application. Professor Carpenter points out
that at the present time, the incorporators instead of the State prepare
the articles of incorporation. Accordingly he believes that the concept
of the corporation as a group of persons acting as a legal unit is the
true one, since this theory avoids unjust results and allows the courts
much more flexibility in treating the problem. Therefore he advocates
the complete scrapping of the doctrine of special powers and an adoption
of the early English theory of general powers, i.e., that the corporation
is capable of performing any act which may be performed by the indi-
vidual. Under this theory the corporation is still not authorized to do
anything which is contrary to its charter powers, express or implied; but
it must be kept in mind that there is a distinction between capacity and
authority.
(2) He declares that in view of the numerous and often complicated
charter provisions of the modern corporation, it is unreasonable to
charge those dealing with the corporate entity with constructive notice
thereof. Certainly one could scarcely be expected to have knowledge of
the charter provisions of every corporation with which he deals, espe-
cially in view of the inaccessibility of corporate records to persons who
are travelling from one place to another or who live at a distance from
the place where the records are kept. He compares this doctrine with
the one which obtains in partnership law, and declares that the rule of
pure agency law should be adopted with respect to corporations. The
agency rule here mentioned is the usual rule of agency law which makes
a contract enforceable where it is made with an agent who has apparent
authority to enter into the agreement, irrespective of the lack of actual
authority in the agent. Hence he advocates the complete abandonment
of the doctrine of constructive notice.
(3) As Mr. Carpenter recognizes, an ultra vires contract is certainly
illegal in one sense of the term, since it is unlawful for a corporation to
exceed the powers granted by its charter or articles of incorporation;
however, he points out that the consequences of a violation of these
provisions should not be the same as the consequences of a transaction
which is contrary to the public welfare or one which is prohibited by
statute. The rationale is that the ultra vires contract is not truly illegal
in the sense of being contra bonos inores, but is only one which the cor-
poration is unauthorized to make.
(4) Furthermore, he does not believe that public policy demands
that a contract made by a corporation in excess of its charter powers be
treated as void or inactionable. If the contract, besides being ultra vires,
is undesirable for some other reason, it should be declared illegal for
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that reason and not on the ground that it is unauthorized by the cor-
porate articles.
(5) It is Mr. Carpenter's view that unless the security on which the
intra vires creditor depends is endangered in some manner by the ultra
vires transaction, he should not be allowed to interfere-his interest is
said to be insufficient. Furthermore even if the security is in danger of
impairment, the creditor should be protected, if at all, by legal principles
other than the doctrine of ultra vires.
(6) He evidently believes that a stockholder should be granted an
injunction to prevent corporate officials from entering into ultra vires
transactions, and that,.if such a contract has already been entered into,
the stockholder should be allowed to recover resulting damages from
the officers and directors. Moreover, if the contract has been made, the
aforementioned principles of agency law should govern its validity as to
third parties.
The objections which Professor Carpenter makes to the theory of
limited capacity had been expressed much earlier by other writers. One
commentator stressed the fact that since corporate charters are now
prepared by the incorporators themselves under general laws instead of
by the legislators, the importance of the doctrine of limited capacity is
no longer existent, but rather that there is now a need of reviving the
older doctrine.41 Professor Pepper, in 1898, argued in favor of such a
revival, saying: "We shall never see our commercial law in a satisfactory
state until the courts re-establish the common law doctrine of general
capacities, treating contracts made beyond the limits of chartered activ-
ities as contracts prohibited but not void-and leave the state to punish
the disregard of the prohibition, while enforcing the contract between
the parties."'42
Another recognized authority on this subject, Professor Stevens, 43
advocating in substance the adoption of the foregoing principles, pro-
poses that the doctrines of limited capacity and constructive notice be
abolished by statute, and that the course be left free to settle individual
cases involving other diverse interests. Such a rule would facilitate
flexibility. He further declares that the enforceability of all purely ultra
vires contracts, whether partially executed or wholly executed, or ex-
ecutory, should be governed by certain general rules of agency law,
whereby the results would be as follows: The stockholder would be pro-
tected in proper cases, but not when such protection would lead to unjust
consequences for the party dealing with the corporation. A corporation
'" Wolfman, "Ultra Vires" Acts of Corporations (1909) 43 Amt. L. REv. 69.
42 Pepper, Rights Under Unauthorized Corporate Contracts (1898) 8 YALE L. J.
24, 31.
"Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra
Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 297.
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should be permitted to -defend itself by a plea of ultra vires only as
against one who, as a prudent man, could and should, or did ascertain
the officers' true authority. In other words, he desires to place the
articles of incorporation on the §ame basis as the by-laws.
III. STATUTORY ENACTMENTS AND CRITICISMS
The general theory of Carpenter and Stevens seems to have been
embodied in the Uniform Business Corporations Act, wherein the doc-
trines of limited capacity and constructive notice are abolished 4 4 and
the courts left free to work out proper and equitable rules in dealing
with problems as they present themselves. Thus in states adopting the
Uniform Act, we see a return to the old common law doctrine of general
capacity as a result of modern conditions. Professor Ballantine criticizes
this statute, declaring that the "draftsman has failed to indicate clearly
what legal consequences he desired to bring about, but has simply
thrown out a vague direction to courts now hopelessly at sea to swim to
shore through the fog by juggling the words 'capacity' and 'authority' as
best they can. ' 4
5
Provisions similar to those adopted by the Commission on Uniform
Laws have been inserted in the modern Ohio Corporations Act,46 wherein
it is provided that "no limitation on the exercise of the authority of the
corporation shall be asserted in any action between the corporation and
any person, except on behalf of the corporation against a 'director or an
officer or a person having actual knowledge of such limitation." More-
over, "the articles of incorporation shall constitute an agreement by the
director and the officers with the corporation that they will confine the
acts of the corporation to those acts which are authorized in the state-
ment of purposes." Provisions similar to these have been enacted in
Michigan 47 and Minnesota.4 8 Professor Stevens, commenting on this
statute,49 has said that the latter provision should not, and probably will
not, be construed as a guaranty that the management will not enter into
such a transaction, and that officials should only be held liable when they
have been negligent in not ascertaining whether a particular transaction
was permissible. The first provision, allowing the plea of ultra vires
where a person has actual knowledge of the corporation's lack of author-
ity, meets with his approval; but he advocates its extension to include
" UNIFORM BUSINESS CORPORATIONs AcT, §§10, 11. The Model Act approved
by the Commissioners has been adopted in Idaho, Louisiana and Washington. 9
U. L. A. 71 (1941).
" Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law
(1931) 19 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 473.
" OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) §§8623-8, 8623-9.
MicH. STAT. ANNO. (1937) §21.11.
"MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §§7492-10, 7492-11.
"Stevens, Ultra Vires Transactions Under the New Ohio General Corporation
Act (1930) 4 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 419.
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instances where a reasonably prudent man should have ascertained the
true nature of the corporate powers.5 0 Professor Stevens also points
out and approves of the fact that a statute of this type does not interfere
with the privilege of courts of equity tq grant or withhold the extraordi-
nary remedy of specific performance. He believes that equity can be
trusted to withhold this remedy in instances where the granting of the
relief would lead to inequitable results.
Another eminent authority, Professor Ballantine, argues that the
Ohio rule does not sufficiently protect persons dealing with corpora-
tions,51 in that consultation of an attorney would be necessary before
any such person could act in safety. He declares that there is no half-
way remedy, and urges that "the defense of ultra vires must be abolished
as between the corporation and third parties," whether or not they have
actual notice of charter limitations. He further states that the abolition
of the defense of ultra vires should not be used to shield those who were
guilty of actual fraud or conspiracy in inducing the directors or officers
to enter into an unauthorized contract. 52 In such a situation the cor-
poration should be permitted to plead this fraudulent conduct as a
defense.53
Professor Ballantine's ideas are incorporated in the California
statute54 upon this subject, which provides that no limitation contained
in the corporate articles shall be asserted in any action between the
corporation or its stockholders, and a third party. Such provisions, in
that case, actually limit the authority of the corporate representatives
only in actions by the State, or actions by shareholders to enjoin the
carrying on or continuation of unauthorized business-which latter
action is maintainable only when third parties have acquired no rights in
such contracts. Accordingly, under that statute unauthorized contracts
or conveyances would seem to bind both parties, whether executed, or
wholly or in part executory.
The most radical assertion of this idea is found in the Vermont
statute,55 which wholly abolishes the defense of ultra vires by providing
that any otherwise unlawful act of corporate directors shall "be re-
"0 For expressions of approval of the provisions of the Ohio act as being in
accord with the ordinary rules of agency law, see Notes (1932) 39 W. VA. L. Q.
64; (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 594. See also Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Trans-
actions (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 534.
1 Ballantine, Question of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law (1931)
19 CALIF. L. REv. 465. Formerly he seems to have taken the view that the rules of
agency should govern. Cf. Ballantine, Proposed Revision of the Ultra Vires Doe-
trine (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 453.
2 Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporations Law
(1931) 19 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 474.
" Ballantine, Changes in the California Corporation Law (1929) 17 CALIF. L.
REv. 529, 533.
5, CiV. CODE OF CAL. (Deering, 1937) §345.
PuB. LAWS OF VT. (1933) 949, §5817.
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garded as the act of the corporation, and the corporation shall be liable
therefor, even if such act was not necessary or proper to accomplish its
purposes, to the same extent that it would have been liable for such act
had it been necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes."
On the other hand, Professor Ballantine's theory has been adopted
to a lesser extent in the statutes of Lllinois 56 and Pennsylvania. 5 ' Both
statutes provide that no limitation, expressed or implied, in the articles
of incorporation "shall be asserted in order to defend any action at law
or in equity between the corporation and a third person, or between a
shareholder and a third person, involving any contract to which the
corporation is a party or any right of property or any alleged liability
of whatsoever nature." However, it is provided that such a limitation
may be asserted (a) by the state in an action to dissolve the corporation
or to enjoin it from the transaction of unauthorized business, (b) in an
action by a shareholder in a representative suit against the officers or
directors for exceeding the charter powers, or (c) in any action by a
shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the transaction or con-
tinuation of unauthorized business. In regard to the third type of action,
it is provided that the court may, if it is deemed equitable, set aside and
enjoin the performance of the contract, allowing the injured party com-
pensation for damages sustained. However, it is also provided that
anticipated profits to be derived from the performance of the contract
shall not be considered a proper element of -damages.
This injunction provision, seeming to give courts of equity wide
discretion in handling cases as they arise, has been criticized by Pro-
fessor Ballantine on the ground that it would allow the corporation to
avoid a disadvantageous contract by inducing one of its stockholders to
bring proceedings for an injunction.5 8 It is believed, however, that this
criticism is not merited, for such an interpretation of the statute would
leave the law practically as it was before its enactment. 59 Hence it is
doubtful that the courts would allow a shareholder an injunction against
the performance of a contract when such a judgment would be unfair
to third parties. Another writer suggests that the problem would be
greatly simplified if the injunction provision was construed to be appli-
cable only to future unauthorized contracts, but doubts that the pro-
vision was intended so to be interpreted. He further states that if that
is not the proper interpretation, the courts are left in a state of confusion
as to the applicability of this remedy.60
"ILL. ANNO. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) tit. 32, §157.8.
PENNA. STAT. ANxo. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §§2852-9, 2852-301, 2852-303.
SBallantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act
(1934) 1 U. oF Cmn. L. REv. 357, 381.
See note (1935) 29 ILL. L. REN'. 1075.
£0 Note (1930) 44 HARV. L. Rw. 280.
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It is somewhat doubtful, however, whether the interest of the party
dealing with the corporation is sufficiently protected by this type of
statute, in view of its provision negativing anticipated profits as dam-
ages. This clause was evidently inserted as a protection against the
nefarious schemes of persons who seek to draw the corporation into so-
called "wildcat" enterprises. However, as the provision is now worded,
it might easily be employed to defeat recovery of legitimate profits
anticipated from transactions into which third parties entered innocently.
Would not the interests of all concerned be better served by the applica-
tion of the ordinary rules of agency law to this type of statute?
It is further recognized that the Illinois Act makes no mention of
the abrogation of the doctrine of constructive notice, as has been done
in most of the modem statutes above mentioned. It has been said by one
writer that if the Illinois court decided that that doctrine was still in
effect, many former evils of ultra zires would reappear. However, that
writer does not believe that the courts would consider constructive notice
to be such an equitable principle as would warrant the courts in setting
aside or enjoining an unauthorized contract in the face of the statute."1
In spite of these objections, the injunction provisions of the Illinois
Act are decidedly worth-while. Removal of the stated objections, how-
ever, would serve to prevent many otherwise possible injustices.
With all of these developments, the 'doctrine of ultra vires as pro-
pounded by the great majority of courts in this country is still not
satisfactory. Even the majority rule, refusing to enforce executory con-
tracts, fails to meet the situation adequately. It has been said that our
courts are tending to encourage rather than discourage ultra "ires acts
on the part of the corporate officers. 62 That is, the corporate agents or
third parties may have known at the time the contract was made that
the transaction was unauthorized, and have intended to perform only if
carrying out the agreement developed a profit instead of a loss. Thus,
an intentional beforehand consideration of the defense of ultra vires
may often result in the forces of law aiding a premeditatedly guilty
party in depriving innocent persons of profits of business to which they
otherwise would have been entitled.
IV. CONCLUSION
Granting that the ultra vires 'doctrine as thus applied is outmoded,
just what are we to do in attempting to modernize the law in this re-
spect? How and by what methods are we to protect to the best advan-
tage the various interests involved? As those attempting to formulate
statutes have found, the problem is not an easy one.
On the whole, the general principles advocated by Carpenter and
"1 Note (1935) 29 ILL. L. REv. 1075.
12 Scarborough, Ultra Vires No Defense in Private Contract (1923) 11 Ky.
L. J. 197.
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Stevens and their school of thought seem to offer the best solution.
However, while their analogy to the familiar principles of agency law
presents an easy and sensible way out of the difficulty, it gives question-
able results in at least one aspect. That is, while we are willing to follow
the analogy to the extent of allowing the corporation to avoid liability
on an unauthorized contract where the other party actually' knew that
the transaction was in excess of the charter powers, we do not believe that
this proposition should be extended to include those situations where a
person is merely negligent in not ascertaining that the contract was
unauthorized. Such a rule would be difficult to administer, and might
be employed to lessen benefits to be gained from the abolishment of the
doctrine of constructive notice. If such a rule were followed, just where
would the duty of the party dealing with the corporation end? Would
he be required to inquire into the actual authority of the corporation in
order not to be negligent? If so, just how far would he be required to
go in his investigation? If to the charter, the new rule is the equivalent
of the old. Of course such a rule might prevent injustice to non-assent-
ing minority stockholders, but such cases would be exceptional, and
would not warrant the adoption of a rule so difficult to apply. On the
other hand, without such a rule, cases might well arise in which the
negligence was so gross that to permit recovery would be unjustifiable.
Yet, some workable rule must be adopted, even though it be a compro-
mise between good and bad results. This consideration was evidently
uppermost in the minds of those who drafted the statutes of Michigan,
Minnesota and Ohio, which deny recovery only to those who have actual
notice of lack of authorization.
And here may be pointed out an admirable feature of the Uniform
Act. By merely pruning off the objectionable doctrines of limited capac-
ity and constructive notice, the Uniform Act has left the courts free to
adopt general rules of law with respect to unauthorized contracts. Thus,
under this type of statute, exceptions may be made with much greater
facility than under statutes which attempt to go further and describe and
delimit rights acquirable under such unauthorized agreements.
Nevertheless, the advantages and disadvantages of both of the pre-
ceding methods are apparent, in that while the Uniform Act is con-
veniently vague, it discourages rigidity, and while the more detailed
statutes are sufficiently, rigid, they are not sufficiently elastic to provide
for exceptional cases.8 3
Another situation calling for examination in view of possible revision
of our laws is where the corporate officials enter an agreement, knowing
at the time that it is unauthorized. Clearly the party dealing with the
03 Note (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 280. See also Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra
Vires in the United States Supreme Court Decisions (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 179-
217, 297-337.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
corporation ought to be permitted to maintain an action, but should the
corporation be allowed to sue? Are we going to permit the corporate
body to enforce a contract which its chosen representatives knew to be
in excess of the charter powers, when such relief is denied where the
third party had such knowledge and the corporate officers did not?04
The Michigan, Minnesota and Ohio statutes appear to answer this
query in the affirmative. And this view would seem to follow the agency
analogy, since the general rule of the law of principal and agent is that
the agent's knowledge is imputed to the principal only when the former
is acting within the scope of his agency.65
On the other hand, it will be remembered that Ballantine's solution
would prevent the plea of ultra vires in any such suit between the cor-
poration and third parties dealing with it. This view seems to go too
far in protecting those who knowingly transact unauthorized business
with the corporation; for, under this theory, with the collusive aid of
officers of the body, third persons could easily take advantage of share-
holders by entering into contracts which they knew were unauthorized,
and the stockholders would necessarily have to prove affirmative fraud
in order to avoid the agreement. While it is true that the shareholders
would yet have recourse over against the officials responsible, insolvency
of such officials and the difficulties inherent in such litigation6 6 might
well make this remedy inadequate. Consequently, the shareholders must
be protected from such chicanery, in spite of the fact that their chosen
representatives also knew that the transaction was unauthorized.
Something of this sort was evidently in the minds of those who
drafted the Illinois and Pennsylvania statutes. The above-mentioned in-
junction provision, contained in both of these acts, seems to be a definite
effort to protect the stockholders from such machinations as those just
described. According to these statutes, the court may set aside or enjoin
the further performance of any unauthorized contract at the request of
a shareholder, provided the court deems such action equitable, and fur-
ther provided the court shall allow compensation for the damages which
may result from its action.
However, as was seen above, in the Illinois and Pennsylvania
statutes a provision is added that anticipated profits are not to be
awarded as loss or damages sustained. The desirability of this clause
may well be questioned. While one of its purposes evidently was to
protect shareholders from being penalized too greatly by the assessment
of damages of a nebulous character, the provision may be employed to
defeat one of the chief purposes behind the statute. An example will
"'A fortiori, if both parties had such knowledge, the contract should be
enforceable.
TIFFANY, LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (2d ed. 1924) §108. p. 294.
MECHEM, AGENCY (3d ed. 1923) §486; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §§272, 273.
"'Berlack, Stockholders' Suits, A Possible Substitute (1937) 35 Micu. L.
REv. 597.
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serve to illustrate this weakness: The directors of a corporation make
an unauthorized contract wherein the profits are largely anticipatory,
but discover before performance that the transaction will result in loss
to the corporation. Immediately they seek a way out of a bad bargain,
and their legal department advises them that, the contract being un-
authorized, this injunction proceeding could be used to forestall a suit
on the contract by the other party. Using some shareholder as- a
dummy, injunction proceedings are instituted. This action is obstensibly
taken to halt performance on the unauthorized contract; in reality it is
brought for the purpose of bringing the case within the statute and thus
escaping the payment of the anticipated loss as an element of damages
in the suit by the opposing party which would follow a refusal to per-
form the contract. Thus by such procedure the very purpose for which
the statute was enacted, namely, the abrogation of the defense of ultra
vires in actions between corporations and parties who have dealt with
them, would be circumvented. On the other hand, if anticipatory dam-
ages were not expressly disallowed, this result would not follow, and
where sufficiently ascertainable, such profits would constitute a proper
element of damages-thus further liberalizing the rule. A thorough
consideration of all the interests involved is recommended prior to the
inclusion of such a clause in any proposed revisal of the North Carolina
law in this respect.
As mentioned above, some states which have made statutory changes
in respect to the problem of ultra vires contracts have extended the doc-
trines so enacted to contracts and conveyances made by foreign corpora-
tions. Such an extension is to be commended, and might well be fol-
lowed in any attempt to clarify and modernize the corporation laws.
The changes advocated above would make comparatively few altera-
tions in the law of North Carolina as it is today. The doctrines of
limited capacity and constructive notice would be abrogated, but there
seems no doubt that such action would merely serve to enact substan-
tially the present judicially created rule with the exception of executory
contracts which would then become enforceable, whereas at present it
seems likely that they are not. Furthermore, by such a revision the
interest of stockholders would be protected in all cases except those
where such action would entail an unfair loss to innocent parties. On
the other hand, the defense of no agency, as distinguished from that of
ultra vires, would still be available, 67 thereby allowing the corporation
to avoid contracts which were within neither the actual nor the apparent
authority of its directors or officers.
It is recommended that the attention of the North Carolina General
Assembly be called to the changes needed in the corporation law of the
State in this respect. It is hoped that the discussion of principles herein
set forth will be of some value in the enactment of remedial legislation.
17 See notes (1935) 29 ILL. L. REV. 1075, (1936) 10 TEMP. L. Q. 418.
